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APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) (1992). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by Defendant/Appellant for review are as 
follows: 
1. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded that the 
marital residence of the parties was a marital asset after finding 
that the funds to purchase the residence were derived from co-
mingled funds in an account accessed by the Defendant alone despite 
Defendant's testimony that he had kept funds separated and had made 
ongoing mortgage payments from a pre-marital retirement account? 
The applicable standard of review for this issue is the "clear 
abuse of discretion" standard as stated in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 
1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
2. Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the marital 
residence sold and the assets divided equally between the parties, 
and when it granted Plaintiff possession of the marital residence 
pending sale? 
The applicable standard of review for this issue is 
the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated in Kerr v. Kerr, 
610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
3. Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the 1988 Jaguar 
automobile sold and the proceeds divided equally between the 
parties despite Defendant's claim of a pre-marital interest in it? 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as 
stated in Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991). 
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
4. Did the Trial Court err when it awarded the Porsche 
automobile to Plaintiff as pre-marital property despite Defendant 
claiming a marital interest in it due to marital funds being used 
to repair or refurbish it? 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as 
stated in Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991). 
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The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
5. Did the Trial Court err when it affixed the value of the 
Defendant's retirement account (401k salaries savings plan) at the 
value on the date of trial and simultaneously declined to adopt 
California law concerning division of the asset when Defendant had 
not challenged Utah jurisdiction, and where Defendant had 
repeatedly asserted Utah residency during all stages of the 
proceedings. 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as 
stated in Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991). 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's application of the law is the "correction of error" 
standard as stated in Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 
1990) giving no deference to the trial court. 
6. Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the Blazer 
automobile sold and the proceeds divided equally between the 
parties despite testimony that the vehicle had decreased in value 
between the date of separation and trial? 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as 
stated in Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991). 
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The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
7. Did the Trial Court err when it did not order Plaintiff 
to repay funds taken as salary from the marital business during the 
pendency of this action? 
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
8. Did the Trial Court err when it did not order Plaintiff 
to compensate Defendant for damage to his firearms despite 
Defendant's testimony that Plaintiff's son had caused the damage 
and that the firearms were in the physical possession of Plaintiff 
during the pendency of this action? 
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
9. Did the Trail Court err when it declined to designate 
child support arrearages from Plaintiff's prior marriage as a 
marital asset? 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's application of the law is the "correction of error" 
standard as stated in Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 
1990) giving no deference to the trial court. 
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The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980)• 
10. Did the Trial Court err when it did not order that credit 
card debt incurred by Defendant be paid from business income or 
from the proceeds of the sale of the business? 
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property 
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated 
in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
11. Did the Trial Court err when it found Defendant in 
contempt of court. 
The applicable standard of review for testing the Trial 
Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as 
stated in Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i) 
Utah Code Annotated §78-32-1 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
After a violent incident of spouse abuse, Plaintiff filed her 
complaint for divorce on May 5, 1992. (R. at 2)1 From the outset 
the case has been hotly contested as evidenced by the numerous 
hearings to dispose of motions and enforce temporary court orders. 
(R. at 42, 46-48, 78-83, 128-130, 135-146). On August 12, 1992, 
throughout the brief the literal lfRff will stand for Record of 
the case and the literal "T" will stand for the transcript of the 
trial. The numbers following the literals will indicate the page 
where the material referenced can be located. 
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the court conducted a scheduling conference• (R. at 63) . Trial was 
conducted on December 3, 4, and 10, 1992. (R. at 268). On the 
final day of trial, and after the Judge had reviewed substantial 
personal notes of the trial, over 60 exhibits and pertinent case 
law, the trial court gave oral findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and decree of divorce from the bench. (R. at 737 et. seg.). 
Each party submitted a written version of proposed findings, 
conclusions and decree. Defendant filed a motion for rehearing on 
January 13, 1993 which was denied. (R. at 283, 290). Other post-
trial motions were filed which were all resolved in conformity with 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and the decree of divorce 
signed and entered February 19, 1993. (R. at 359-382). The court 
further disposed of any post-trial issues when, on March 31, 1993, 
the court signed its own Order doing so. That Order was entered on 
April 1, 1993. (R. at 406-411). 
On March 16, 1993, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 
at 392) . Later, Defendant filed a docketing statement together 
with an Amended Notice of Appeal seeking to challenge the court's 
disposition of post-trial motions as well as its findings, 
conclusions and decree. (R. at 474) . Plaintiff timely filed her 
Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement as well. 
At the trial, the parties each advanced the position that the 
Defendant's retirement account be divided pursuant to the 
guidelines established in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 
1982) , and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be 
entered. 
6 
The Court denied Plaintiff's request for alimony. Plaintiff's 
total income was established as $1,150 per month. Of that amount, 
$1,000 was compensation from the business owned by the parties at 
the time of their separation. The court ordered that asset be sold 
but failed to consider the loss of income to Plaintiff which would 
certainly result at the time of the sale. 
Evidence and testimony also established that Defendant 
currently earned a salary in excess of $65,600 per year working at 
Lockheed over and above his airforce retirement of $14,000 per year 
(T. at 663) making his total income approximately $6,638 per month. 
(T. at 663; see also Exhibit 16 (1991 Form 1040 income tax 
return)). 
The Court also denied Plaintiff's request for attorney fees. 
Testimony concerning attorney fees presented by way of cross-
examined testimony (T. at 244- 246; 438-443) was un-rebutted. The 
Court failed to make any finding with regard to the reasonableness 
of the fee, (T. at 762) , the absence of which is fatal and suggests 
that a remand of this case may be appropriate for additional 
findings and the possible award of attorney fees. Muir v. Muir, 841 
P.2d 736, 741-742 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on August 17, 1985. (R. at 2; T. at 
485). This was a second marriage for each party. (T. at 85 and 
417) . 
Each party brought pre-marital assets to the marriage, and the 
parties acquired assets during the marriage. Some assets were 
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acquired from the proceeds of pre-marital assets. Specifically, 
the proceeds from the sale of each of their prior homes became the 
focus of much testimony at trial. Defendant's prior home was 
located in Mission Hills, California, and Plaintiff's prior home 
was located in Agua Dulce, California. 
Testimony at trial was contradictory when attempts were made 
to trace the proceeds from the sale of each home after the 
marriage. Defendant maintained that the proceeds were kept 
separate while Plaintiff testified that the proceeds were 
commingled and controlled solely by Defendant. 
Plaintiff's prior husband was ordered to pay child support for 
their minor child but failed to do so. (T. at 200). Ultimately, 
Plaintiff's prior husband filed bankruptcy. (T. at 535, 630) . 
Defendant alleged that in effect Plaintiff's arrearage claim 
against her prior spouse would amount to $64,250.00 and that he had 
in effect provided that amount in support since he had provided for 
the minor child throughout the marriage. (T. at 379) . Defendant 
urged the court to consider the arrearage amount as a marital asset 
when making the final property distribution. The court found and 
ruled otherwise. (T. at 738). 
The parties eventually moved to Utah. They purchased a home 
and a business. Testimony was contradictory as to what funds were 
used to make the purchases. The Trial Court found and concluded 
that commingled funds were used to make the purchases (T. at 750) 
and that the assets were marital property. The court ordered the 
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home and the business sold and the proceeds divided equally (T. at 
749,750). 
Defendant continued to work in California, returning by car at 
least weekly to Utah. Defendant eventually purchased an airplane 
to reduce his commuting time. (T. at 634). 
Defendant asserted Utah residence throughout the proceedings 
in the court below. (T. at 738). But, at trial, Defendant 
asserted that California law ought to govern the distribution of 
his 401K salaried savings plan since he was earning his salary in 
California. The Trial Court rejected his legal argument. (T. at 
738) . 
During the pendency of the proceedings, Plaintiff and 
Defendant received an IRS income tax refund. The check was mailed 
to Defendant, and although a joint refund, was cashed by Defendant 
alone and held by him alone. Defendant had used some portion of 
the refund to pay for accounting fees and hanger fees for his 
airplane. (T. at 594). The balance was held in his own account 
(T. at 651) despite the court having ordered it to be used for the 
expenses of the Sportsman's Lounge. Ultimately, when Defendant 
made a motion for rehearing and other post-trial motions, the court 
learned that Defendant had still not complied with the court's 
prior orders concerning the use of the refund and found him in 
contempt. (R. at 406-411). 
The property division directed by the Trial Court attempted to 
return pre-marital property to each party, and divide the marital 
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estate equally. Defendant contends that the court erred in this 
approach to the division with respect to a few items. 
Plaintiff was unemployed during the majority of the marriage. 
After the parties separated, Plaintiff has been able to earn 
$1,000.00 per month from her work at the marital business, and $150 
per month from another part-time job. Due to the relatively new 
financial condition of the business attributable to the efforts of 
the Plaintiff, it is uncertain whether the business will sustain an 
income to Plaintiff at this present level. At any rate, the 
business has been ordered sold, and the $1,000.00 per month income 
will no longer be available to Plaintiff. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff argues that the judgment of the trial court as to 
property distribution should be affirmed. Plaintiff argues that 
the judgment of the trial court as to alimony and attorney fees 
should be reversed. 
Plaintiff asserts that the marital residence was a marital 
asset because the trial court correctly found that the funds used 
for the purchase of that asset were commingled from premarital 
assets of each party. Likewise, the Sportsman's Lounge is a 
marital asset. The trial court correctly ordered these marital 
assets sold and the proceeds divided evenly. There is adequate 
testimony, evidence, and specific findings to support such a result 
and the court did not abuse its discretion in making the 
disposition. 
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The other claims of Defendant are without merit and are 
included in this appeal simply to vex and harass Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff asserts the correctness of the trial court's award of 
other items of personal property. To wit: 
(1) The 1988 Jaguar automobile which was a marital asset 
because it was purchased from the proceeds of commingled funds (an 
equity loan against the marital residence); 
(2) The Porsche automobile which Plaintiff owned prior to 
marriage. This result is correct despite Defendant's claim that he 
made repairs and enhanced the value of the automobile, when 
testimony was presented to demonstrate that he was reimbursed for 
the repairs made; 
(3) That Utah law should apply to distribution of the 
Defendant's 401K retirement plan earned during the marriage, and 
that the court correctly applied Utah law rather than California 
law; 
(4) The blazer automobile was properly valued on the date of 
trial, it having been found to be a marital asset; 
(5) The trial court acted properly when it did not require 
Plaintiff to repay the salary she had drawn from the business when 
she demonstrated a full accounting for the funds so taken, and 
because she single-handedly worked daily to preserve the marital 
asset and earn a positive cash flow. Had the court ruled 
otherwise, it would inequitable to take earnings from Plaintiff and 
award them to Defendant It would amount to unjust enrichment; 
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(6) The evidence was so weak that Plaintiff's minor child 
damaged Defendant's firearms that the court did not compensate 
Defendant for the loss he alone claimed. Such self-serving 
testimony is often overlooked by the trier of fact. That is the 
trial court judge's determination. Plaintiff asserts that even if 
the trial court failed to consider the claim, it does not amount to 
a reversible error; 
(7) The trial court correctly refused to consider unpaid child 
support from a prior spouse as a marital asset. The case law 
provides Defendant with a cause of action for recovering the 
substituted child support he provided. If the court is to 
reconsider this issue, the law is clear that the "asset" belongs to 
Defendant, and Plaintiff should be compensated for that advantage 
in the distribution of marital assets; 
(8) Defendant argues that the trial court exercised its 
discretion. It is supposed to. The court did not award Defendant 
compensation for paying his airplane expenses charged on his 
personal bank card. The court was justified in doing so because of 
its broad discretion. Defendant maintained the bank card, charged 
on it during the separation period and the court declined to award 
compensation to Defendant. A claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion cannot be sustained under the evidence; and 
(9) Because Defendant repeatedly defied court orders when he 
in fact was capable of compliance but simply refused to comply, was 
sufficient grounds to justify a contempt finding. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WAS A MARITAL ASSET 
HAVING BEEN PURCHASED BY COMMINGLED FUNDS 
At trial, each party maintained opposing views and testimony 
concerning the source of funds used to purchase the home and 
business located in Cedar City, Utah. A marshalling of the 
evidence as required by Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 
1992) shows that Plaintiff testified that she believed the funds 
for the purchase of the home came from a joint bank account (T. at 
53). Plaintiff did not have a separate bank account (T. at 53) . 
Marjorie Young, a witness, testified that at the time she and 
her husband sold the residence to the Smiths, she believed that 
they were selling it to "Richard and Lynda together." (T. at 299-
301). Exhibit 8 is the earnest money sales agreement. It bears 
both Richard (Defendant) and Lynda's (Plaintiff) signatures. 
Defendant testified that the parties' original intention was 
to move to Utah and that they in fact did sign the earnest money 
sales agreement as husband and wife. But, owing to the bankruptcy 
of Plaintiff's prior spouse Plaintiff was excluded from the 
transaction due to her poor credit rating. (T. at 537). Defendant 
testified further that he had agreed with Plaintiff to 
"put my house up for sale, take the profit from my house, 
take it to the house in Agua Dulce, fix it up. . . . Put 
a pool in, landscape it, sell it and move to a place that 
we both wanted to reside in California." (T. at 535). 
Next, Defendant testified that when the Agua Dulce home sold, 
they realized $101,000.00 proceeds. (T. at 586). Defendant was 
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paid with one check and he deposited it in his savings account. 
(T. at 587). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 is the deposit receipt showing a 
$100,542.55 balance in that account after the deposit. The court 
could have reasonably concluded that the $542.55 was a pre-existing 
balance in as much as the amount did not coincide with Defendant's 
testimony. 
In testifying about what happened to those funds, Defendant 
said: 
"Lynda and I sat down, and we went over the $100,000 that 
we had. We had been pretty financially strapped. I was 
paying for the motor home. I asked her if we could pay 
that off. That was a little over $5,000. There was a 
couple of other things that we cleared up bill-wise that 
we had acquired during the time that we were financially 
strapped, and we paid off a few bills." (T. at 587-588). 
I ultimately took $60,000 and put that in a joint 
account, and I had — I think I put $2 0,000 back into my 
account to offset the monthly payments I had made and 
some other things that I had done. 
Q. All right. And you say $55,000.00 was paid down. 
What happened to the other $5,000 that was put into an 
account? 
A. We used that to open the — the checking account for 
the inventory of the bar. 
Q. So what happened to the balance, then, of the funds 
realized upon sale of that home? 
A. Over the following year, every time the Sportsmens 
Lounge or my wife came to me and said, "I need more 
money," I would take that out of my savings account and 
write her a check to be put in the Sportsmens Lounge 
account. (T. at 588)(emphasis added). 
This testimony demonstrates that Defendant had exclusive 
control over the funds and that the funds were used for business 
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and other purposes incident to the marriage. There are no 
identifiable funds remaining from the proceeds of the sale of the 
Agua Dulce home. (T. at 588). 
On cross examination the Defendant gave a more detailed 
accounting of the funds received from the sale of the Agua Dulce 
home: 
A. It was issued to me in my name. 
Q. And where was it deposited? 
A. Initially I put it in the only savings account I 
had. And at Lynda's request, I put that money in a joint 
savings account. 
Q. Did your account already have your funds in it? 
A. I took everything out of that account when I 
initially put that money in there. The deposit slip 
shows $1,100 — or one thousand — a hundred thousand one 
— I'll get it right. $101,000 in there. (T. at 660, 
661) . 
Defendant's testimony was inconsistent with Exhibit 10 and 
Plaintiff's testimony. Continuing Defendant's testimony: 
Q. You testified , I believe, that $55,000 of that 
money was used for down payment on the lounge; is that 
correct? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. . . . And would you just restate the disposition of 
the remaining $45,000. 
A. Well, an additional $5,000 went into the start-up of 
the business. An additional $5,000 went to my wife at 
some point in time. $5,000 went to VFW; $5,000 went to 
pay off the motor home. . . . I had approximately 
$18,000 when we started the bar, and I put that back into 
the bar. 
Q. How much went to the motor home? . . . 
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A. A little over — I think I owed like $6,200 to pay 
it off. My payments were pretty steep. . . .1 paid it 
off. 
. . . Well, I think that's about everything I did 
with it. I put some money in my account. And the reason 
I did that is because I had — I paid off all the loans 
I had borrowed against that house in Agua Dulce when it 
was quit-claimed to me. 
I still had some outstanding bills, and I had been 
making monthly payments on those things that wasn't 
accounted for, and we sat down — I went through that 
ledger — I had to pay my son-in-law money. I had bought 
all kinds of things to refurbish that house in Agua 
Dulce. (T. at 661, 662). 
The exhibits reveal that the earnest money sales agreement 
bore both signatures (Exhibit 8), but from the closing the final 
deed bears only Defendant's signature (Exhibit 6). 
Mr. Murie testified that the bank wanted Mrs. Smith to sign a 
waiver (waiver of interest) form at the closing. (T. at 544) . 
But, he could not remember if it was in fact signed or not. (T. at 
544). And, if it was not signed the loan would not close. (T. at 
548) . He also testified that such a document would be in three 
places after the closing, "in the title company's office, the 
courthouse, and the brokerage. . . " where he used to work. (T. at 
547). Further, that it would not be possible for someone to gain 
access to the documents after the closing to alter them. (T. at 
547). It is significant to note the document was not produced at 
the trial despite significant efforts to locate it by both parties. 
The applicable law is found in Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166 
(Utah App. 1990) . There the court stated the steps that the trial 
court should follow in determining an appropriate property 
division. First, the trial court should "properly categorize the 
property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property 
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of one or the other. "2 Burt, at 1172. Second, the court should 
"consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be 
shown, proceed to an equitable distribution in light of those 
circumstances. . . ." Id. And finally, those two steps having 
been done, the final step is to consider "whether, following 
appropriate divisions of the property, one party or the other is 
entitled to alimony." Id. 
The Court of Appeals further explained that separate property 
could properly be considered part of the marital estate "where the 
parties had inextricably commingled the property with marital 
property so that it lost its separate character." Burt, at 1169 
(citations omitted). 
The trial court commented at the time it announced its 
findings that as to marital property there was a "lot of disputed 
testimony." (T. at 744). The court determined the marital 
residence to be an asset of the marital estate, and found that the 
funds used to purchase the asset had indeed been commingled, and 
that since the parties each received their premarital home proceeds 
during the marriage it would be inequitable to award a pre-marital 
interest to one party over the other when each party had 
contributed pre-marital assets for the acquisition. (T. at 750) .3 
2The Court states "Each party is presumed to be entitled to all 
of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property." Id. 
3The court stated: "While the defendant unilaterally placed 
his home — his name, excuse me, on the Cedar City home, the Court 
finds that the property was purchased during the time of the 
marriage. Each party lived in the home. The plaintiff 
continuously, and the defendant on weekends. And all of the real 
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Then the court ordered the assets sold and the proceeds divided 
equally. 
The Trial Court correctly followed the Burt requirements. 
Further, the trial court did not make a clearly erroneous factual 
finding. The court considered the weight of the evidence before it 
and ruled accordingly. Its finding is sufficiently supported by 
the evidence. The court did not commit reversible error. Hagan v. 
Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991). 
II. THE EQUAL DIVISION OP THE MARITAL RESIDENCE 
PROCEEDS FROM SALE IS AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE 
ASSET. 
As discussed in the previous section, the Trial Court was 
faced with the evidence that the funds used to purchase the marital 
residence had been commingled, that premarital proceeds came to 
each party during the marriage, that Defendant had exclusive 
control over the funds and the court concluded that the asset was 
a marital asset. (T. at 750, 751). Under the Burt analysis, the 
court next moved to consider the existence of exceptional 
property purchased in Cedar City should be treated as marital 
property. To treat the plaintiff's $100,000 home sale proceeds as 
commingled assets and then turn around and treat the Defendant's 
$46,000 home sale proceeds as separate property may be what the 
defendant alone planned but would not be equitable and isn't 
justified under the — under the evidence as I see it. 
No signed waiver has been produced, but even — even with the 
asset being just in his name, I believe both parties had — and the 
Court finds each party owned a premarital home. Each party 
received the proceeds from their premarital home after this 
marriage. The plaintiff in the amount of $100,000 in October of 
'90, and the defendant in the amount of $46,000 in June of 1988. 
The assets were commingled. Each party shared in the use of the 
proceeds, and in fact the $100,000 of hers, she testifies went in 
an account with only his name on it. I view that as a — as a 
commingling of the assets." (T. at 750, 751). 
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circumstances and then, if found, proceed to make an equitable 
division. 
In assessing whether or not there were exceptional 
circumstances, a marshalling of the evidence as required by Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) reveals that there may 
indeed have been exceptional circumstances in this case. As 
discussed in the previous section, Plaintiff and Defendant each 
received premarital proceeds from the sale of their prior homes 
during the marriage. The funds were deposited into Defendant's 
account with his name alone on the account. The funds were 
commingled and commonly used between them. Each party used the 
assets during the marriage. (T. at 750, 751). The court then 
proceeded under Burt to make an equitable distribution. In so 
proceeding, the Court did not abuse its discretion. 
III. THE 1988 JAGUAR IS RIGHTFULLY CONSIDERED A MARITAL 
ASSET AND WAS RIGHTFULLY ORDERED SOLD AND THE 
PROCEEDS DIVIDED EVENLY. 
At trial, the court had testimony before it that some pre-
marital funds were used for a down payment on a 1984 Corvette, that 
the vehicle was sold and funds from a home equity loan advance were 
combined with the proceeds from the Corvette sale to purchase the 
1988 Jaguar, (T. at 554, 559, 560). The trial court established 
that the home was a marital asset, there having been commingling of 
funds used for its purchase. (T. at 750, 751). There is no pre-
marital interest remaining in the automobile because the proceeds 
used for purchase were commingled from other marital assets. Any 
use of the home in the transaction amounts to further commingling 
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of assets. Property may appropriately be considered part of the 
marital estate where the parties have inextricably commingled the 
property with marital property so that it has lost its separate 
character. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990). 
Although the court heard testimony that the 1984 Corvette was 
purchased as a gift for Plaintiff (T. at 175, 400) and Defendant's 
daughter testified it was not a gift for Plaintiff (T. at 476) it 
could conclude that this testimony was irrelevant in light of the 
commingling. It could as well conclude that Plaintiff's testimony 
was the more credible testimony and could then disregard the 
testimony of Defendant's daughter. 
The court had before it sufficient evidence to support the 
court's finding that the asset was a marital asset and thus its 
finding was not clearly erroneous. Conflicting testimony is often 
encountered at trial and the trial court must judge the credibility 
and weight each testimony would receive. Yelderman v. Yelderman, 
669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983). 
The court did not clearly abuse its discretion in ordering the 
vehicle sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties 
when it had already determined the home to be a marital asset. 
Once the home achieved marital status due to commingling, the asset 
and proceeds thereof would maintain a marital characterization. 
The fact that Defendant claims to have used the asset [home used as 
collateral] for his own purchases, does not make the asset his sole 
and separate or premarital property. 
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IV. THE PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE WAS A PRE-MARITAL ASSET 
RIGHTFULLY RETURNED TO PLAINTIFF IN THE PROPERTY 
DIVISION. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO OFFSET FOR 
REPAIR BILLS HE PAID. 
Testimony at trial was undisputed that the Porsche automobile 
was a pre-marital asset belonging to Plaintiff. (T. at 179). It 
was rightfully returned to her in the property division since the 
trial court made no findings as to any exceptional circumstances to 
over-ride the presumptive rule of Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1172 
(Utah App. 1990); see also Hall v. Hall, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 
(Utah Ct. App. August 10, 1993). 
During the marriage repairs were made which exceed the present 
value of the automobile. (T. at 376, 377). Plaintiff testified 
that Defendant reimbursed himself for any personal expenses out of 
her proceeds from the sale of her home in California. (T. at 
670) . If the court believed that a reimbursement had taken place, 
then the claim for marital property is lost and the vehicle was 
rightfully returned to Plaintiff. 
The court determined that the asset was pre-marital. Its 
finding was not clearly erroneous. It returned the property to 
Plaintiff which did not amount to a clear abuse of discretion. 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990). The court 
could have reasonably concluded that reimbursement was taken by 
Defendant from Plaintiff's pre-marital funds. 
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V. DEFENDANT'S 4OIK RETIREMENT FUND WAS PROPERLY 
VALUED ON THE DATE OP TRIAL, AND UTAH LAW SHOULD 
GOVERN THE ISSUES OP PROPERTY DIVISION AND NOT THE 
LAW OP CALIFORNIA. 
The trial court has broad discretion in making equitable 
orders with respect to property division in the Decree of Divorce. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5. And, as a general rule, 
the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce 
decree. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); 
accord Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218, 1222,23 (Utah 
1980). 
Moreover, any deviation from the general rule must be 
supported by sufficient detailed findings of fact that 
explain the trial court's basis for such deviation. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 
1990){Morgan I). 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (June 15, 1993); 
see also Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 
1980)(citations omitted)("the marital estate is evaluated according 
to what property exists at the time the marriage is terminated.11). 
The trial court made no findings as to any exceptional 
circumstances which should take this case out of the presumptive 
rule stated in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990) 
that the marital assets should be divided equally between the 
parties or from the general principles illustrated by the other 
cases cited in this section. 
The court in the instant case valued this asset on the date of 
the decree. There is no evidence of abuse of discretion and no 
error in application of the law. 
Defendant argues that California law applies to the division 
of this asset. There is no basis for this argument. Defendant 
consistently asserted Utah residency during these proceedings. (T. 
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at 738)• There is no case law to support Defendant's contention 
that the state law of the state in which the income is produced 
should in any way be considered in making a property distribution 
during divorce particularly when both parties submit to the law of 
the forum state and actively participate in proceedings there. 
VI. THE BLAZER AUTOMOBILE WAS PROPERLY VALUED ON THE 
DATE OF THE TRIAL DESPITE A CONTENTION THAT IT HAD 
BEEN REDUCED IN VALUE BY A THIRD PARTY DURING THE 
SEPARATION OP THE PARTIES. 
As a general rule, 
the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce 
decree. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); 
accord Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218, 1222,23 (Utah 
1980). 
Moreover, any deviation from the general rule must be 
supported by sufficient detailed findings of fact that 
explain the trial court's basis for such deviation. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P. 2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 
1990){Morgan I). 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 4 6 (June 15, 199 3); 
see also Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 
1980) (citations omitted) ("the marital estate is evaluated according 
to what property exists at the time the marriage is terminated.11) . 
The claim that the trial court clearly abused its discretion 
cannot be sustained under the evidence before the court. The court 
followed the controlling law in this State and valued the assets on 
the date of the termination of the marriage. Further, any 
contention as to a decrease in value was heard by the court. The 
court is entitled to adjudicate the weight and credibility of the 
witnesses and evidence before it. Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P. 2d 
406,408 (Utah 1983). Simply because the court declined to be 
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persuaded by Defendant's testimony, ruling in favor of Plaintiff 
does not in and of itself constitute reversible error. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DID NOT REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO REPAY MONEY TAKEN 
AS SALARY FROM THE BUSINESS WHEN THE SOLE EFFORTS 
OF THE PLAINTIFF PRODUCED THE INCOME. 
From the first court involvement in this matter, Plaintiff was 
awarded the responsibility of the business. As such, she worked 
full-time to sustain the business without any effort or 
participation by Defendant. The court heard testimony from Mr. 
Grimshaw, the accountant for the business, that for the first time 
since it opened the business was turning a modest profit. He 
advised Plaintiff to withdraw the salary equivalent for her 
personal efforts in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. 
As a matter of equity, Plaintiff should have been compensated 
for her efforts to single handedly run the business. The business 
was enhanced by the efforts of Plaintiff, not diminished in any 
way. In fact, for the first time, the business was operating in 
the black under the management of Plaintiff. (T. at 748). The 
court heard testimony and found that the business could not sustain 
a separate manager. (T. at 748). The court had discretion to 
determine that some compensation for significant effort was needed 
in this case. The claim that the trial court abused its discretion 
cannot be sustained under the facts and evidence of this case. 
Plaintiff accounted for all funds of the business at the trial, and 
sought competent advice from her bookkeeper before proceeding to 
use surplus funds. 
. . . . 
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DID NOT ORDER PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT FOR 
DAMAGE TO FIREARMS WHEN SUCH DAMAGE WAS NOT THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF. 
The only evidence before the court to sustain the incident of 
damage to Defendant's guns was the testimony of Defendant himself. 
Plaintiff's minor son Chris testified that he used the guns (T. at 
2 68) but, there was no independent evidence that damage resulted 
from the use. It was apparent from the testimony of the minor 
child that there were bad feelings between Defendant and himself. 
(T. at 2 63 - 2 68). The court was faced with the testimony before 
it and weighed the credibility. The court did not modify the 
distribution to reflect Defendant's claim, but such action by the 
court does not sustain the claim that there was a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
IX. ARREARAGES FROM UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT DUE PLAINTIFF FROM 
A PRIOR SPOUSE ARE NOT AN ASSET OF THE MARITAL ESTATE AND 
WERE RIGHTFULLY ELIMINATED FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE OR 
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO DEFENDANT FOR COLLECTION WITH AN 
OFFSET TO PLAINTIFF. 
Child support payments assessed against and unpaid by one 
spouse can become a debt to the person who provided support, or the 
child has the right personally to collect from the non-custodial 
parent. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d. 430 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant married Plaintiff and took care of her and the minor 
child from that point forward. (T. at 379) . Plaintiff's prior 
spouse contributed nearly nothing during that time. Plaintiff's 
minor child has now passed his 18th birthday, but had not done so 
prior to trial. Whether or not Defendant actually contributed 
$800.00 per month as child support for Plaintiff's minor son was 
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not raised at trial, although it is undisputed that Defendant 
assumed the obligation to provide for the minor child during the 
marriage. 
It seems inappropriate to consider unpaid child support 
obligations as an asset of a marriage. Marriage is unlike a 
business arrangement where ongoing debt is considered an asset. 
Plaintiff's former spouse declared bankruptcy. No other evidence 
was before the court. The court could have concluded that the 
possibility of collecting the arrearages was too remote and 
therefore did not consider it an asset at all. The claim that the 
trial court made an error of law simply cannot be sustained under 
the evidence before it. 
In the alternative, if this Court determines that indeed the 
asset should have been considered, then perhaps the court should 
apportion the asset to the Defendant, who by case authority has the 
right to collect against the former spouse, and equalize that 
amount with other assets from the marital estate in favor of 
Plaintiff. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO 
ASSESS CREDIT CARD DEBT AGAINST THE ASSETS OF THE 
BUSINESS. 
Defendant argues that the court did not accept his testimony 
as to pre-separation marital debt and should not have required 
Defendant to pay the debt. Even though there was no direct 
testimony to the contrary, "evaluation of the weight and 
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credibility of testimony and evidence is a matter for the trier of 
fact." Yelderman v. Yeldermeui, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant misses the mark when he attempts to assign error to 
the trial court when the court made no findings to justify the 
result he seeks, and absent some special and specific finding one 
is left to speculate as to the reasoning of the judge. No case can 
be found where such speculation justifies reversible error. There 
is no testimony or evidence in the record to suggest that the court 
clearly abused it's discretion. It simply exercised it. 
XI. DEPENDANT WAS PROPERLY HELD IN CONTEMPT 
FOR HIS WILLFUL DISREGARD OF COURT ORDERS 
AND IN LIGHT OF HIS PERSONAL MISCONDUCT 
THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT 
BELOW. 
Defendant was found in contempt of court after his willful 
failure to obey an order of the court when he knew what was 
required, had the ability to comply and intentionally failed to do 
so. Accordingly, Utah Code Annotated §78-32-1 et seq., and the 
case of VonHake v, Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) supports the 
court in finding Defendant in contempt. 
On May 21, 1993, Defendant was ordered to use the IRS tax 
refund to pay expenses of the business. (R. at 24) . He did not 
raise the issue of the credit card debt at that time. Instead, he 
willfully failed to obey the order. He chose to withhold the 
refund from the control of the Plaintiff, who was in possession of 
the business, and paid certain debts which he alone selected. (T. 
at 594) . He had exclusive control over the funds. When the matter 
came to trial on or about December 10, 1992, Defendant still had 
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not complied with the court's order, nor had he complied at the 
time of the post-trial motion hearing before the court. The 
court's finding of contempt was not clearly erroneous. It's 
finding should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed as to all 
aspects of the property settlement. The judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed as to the issues of attorney fees and 
alimony as more fully stated in the Brief of Cross-Appellant herein 
below. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it failed to 
award Plaintiff alimony. The applicable standard of appellate 
review for resolution of this issue is the "clear abuse of 
discretion" standard as cited in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 
(Utah 1980). 
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it denied 
Plaintiff's request that Defendant pay attorney's fees? The 
applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of this 
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issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in Kerr 
v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §3 0-3-3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As presented infra, at page 5 and incorporated herein by this 
reference to avoid unnecessary repetition here. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
As presented infra, at page 7 and incorporated herein by this 
reference to avoid unnecessary repetition here. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross-Appellant argues that the trial 
court made two errors. First, when it failed to award alimony; 
Second, when it failed to award attorney fees. 
As to Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant's claim that the court erred 
when it failed to award alimony, the Court's attention is called to 
the great disparity of income. Plaintiff would be able to earn the 
maximum of $13,800 per year (assuming she could earn the highest 
salary found reasonable by the trial court) and Defendant would 
continue to earn in excess of $70,000 per year. 
The Court's attention is further focused on the trial court's 
failure to make proper findings as to the elements stated in Watson 
v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court 
overlooked the effect that selling the parties marital property 
(the business called the Sportsman's Lounge) would have on 
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Plaintiff's earnings. Presently she draws $1,000 per month from 
that business. However, when it is sold, Plaintiff will be unable 
to earn a replacement income. The trial court found that she could 
earn at the minimum wage rate, and that amount will simply not 
permit Plaintiff to maintain her needs. It will not equalize the 
lifestyles of the parties, and it will not provide sufficient 
income to prevent her from becoming a public charge. 
The trial court failed to make proper findings with regard to 
Defendant's ability to pay. There are inadequate findings as to 
the needs and lifestyle of the Defendant, and most importantly, the 
reasonableness of the expenses stated to the court. 
As to the Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant's claim that the court 
erred in not awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff, the Court's 
attention is called to the case of Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 
421,426 (Utah App. 1990). There the Court required the trial court 
to make a sufficient record identifying factors it considered in 
not awarding the entire attorney as requested by a party at trial. 
The trial court here made no such record. In addition, the cases 
of Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991) and Muir v. 
Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741-742 (Utah App 1992) acknowledge that the 
trial court has some discretion in awarding attorney fees. 
However, the cases also require that the court make particular 
findings with regard to the financial need of the requesting 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees. Here the court failed to 
make any finding as to the reasonableness of the fee. Plaintiff 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS Oil"" ' " '"! "I "" I U«"I » "'0 
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY. 
7* tridi c ir t idiiti-: -iKe adequate factual findings on 
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 material issues for- determining an appropriate alimony award. 
- . re w e n established 
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V :. .. 92) 
' ' awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial 
court to consider each of the following three factors: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of tne receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income for himself or herself; and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
support. If these three factors have been considered, we 
will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless 
such a serious inequity has resulted to manifest a clear 
abuse of discreti-;. -. The ultimate test of an alimc"' 
award is whether the party receiving alimony will be able 
to support him or herself 'as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living enjoyed d.,rinq the marriage." 
Id at 3 (ci tationV . r.ed)'. 
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"In considering these factors, the trial court is required to 
make adequate factual findings on all material issues, unless the 
facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" Barnes v. 
Barnes, 217 Utah Adv. Rep 26, 29 (Utah July 13, 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
The trial court's findings relevant to alimony (T. at 759-762) 
consisted of the court's attempt to follow the Schindler v. 
Schindler, 116 P.2d 84, 91 (Utah App. 1989) criteria for 
determining an alimony award. First, the court found that 
Plaintiff needed $605 per month plus housing costs. It further 
found that the average mortgage expense was $450 per month for a 
total need of $1,055 per month. (T. at 759). The court failed to 
consider the standard of living of the parties and most 
importantly, it failed to consider the effect of selling the 
business from which Plaintiff derived the largest share of her 
income. The court determined that upon sale of the marital estate 
properties, substantial cash would be generated and that the 
Plaintiff would have no dependents to support. 
Next, the court addressed the ability of the receiving spouse 
to produce a sufficient income for herself. The court found 
Plaintiff capable of producing $5 to $6 per hour outside the bar in 
sales or clerical employment. Even at the $6 per hour rate, 
Plaintiff will only be able to earn $1,040 per month working full-
time. This would not sustain her basic needs, let alone provide 
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resources to provide additional support for Plaintiff, the Trial 
Court's failure to award alimony is inequitable. 
As articulated by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he most 
important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.11 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). An alimony 
award should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' 
respective post-divorce living standards. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 
(Utah 1985); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The Utah Supreme Court has articulated three factors 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Jones test" or "Jones factors1') 
that must be considered by the Trial Court in determining a 
reasonable alimony award: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the requesting 
spouse; 
2. The ability of the requesting spouse to 
produce a sufficient income for himself or 
herself; and 
3. The ability of the other spouse to provide support. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1081; Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Rasband, 752 
P.2d at 1333. 
The Trial Court's decision regarding alimony will not be 
overturned "absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). A Trial 
Court's failure to consider the Jones factors constitutes an abuse 
of a Trial Court's discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 101 
(Utah 1986) . If the Jones factors have been considered, an appeals 
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adequate findings. The parties in Bell had been married 
approximately 12 years and had one child at the time of the 
divorce. Id. at 491. The husband was ordered to pay $450.00 per 
month in child support and $250.00 in alimony for two years. The 
husband was also ordered to pay a portion of the wife's attorney 
fees. Id. 
In Bell at the time of the trial, the wife was pursuing a 
masters degree in education and was making $863.00 per month. Id. 
Prior to that time she had a different job where she made $1,500.00 
per month or approximately $18,000.00 per year. The husband was a 
major in the Air Force and at the time of the divorce was making 
$3,660.00 per month or approximately $40,000.00 per year. Id. The 
wife claimed monthly expenses of $2,493.00, while the husband 
claimed $5,090.74. Id. at 493. 
The wife appealed the court's decision and asserted, among 
other things, that the award for alimony was insufficient. In 
reversing the trial court's alimony award, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the award was not supported by adequate findings. 
Id. at 493. The trial court had essentially ignored the three-
pronged Jones test by making inadequate findings regarding the 
needs of the husband and wife and the wife's ability to support 
herself. Id. In addition, the court made no findings regarding 
the reasonableness of claimed expenses by the husband and wife and 
only found that each party had roughly equivalent debts in their 
names. Id. Specifically, the Court there as here failed to find 
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made findings is i the parties' gross nn'.'ir.es " l. s rot :nr.e t-he 
required findings as to the wife's needs. Id. at 1213. The Court 
of Appeals, looking at the fact that the husband's gross income was 
$8,200.00 and the wife's only $2,445.00, concluded that the alimony 
set by court "[did] not come close to equalizing the parties' 
standard of living as of the time of divorce, but allows plaintiff 
a two to four times advantage." Id. The court found clear error 
and remanded the case for findings as to the parties' needs, the 
parties' standard of living at the time of the trial, and for 
adjustments to the alimony "to better equalize the parties' 
abilities to go forward with their respective lives." Id. 
Like Bell, Gardner, Howell, the Court in the present action 
should also reverse the Trial Court's alimony award because its 
findings are inadequate and because injustice would otherwise 
result. The award fails to reasonably equalize the parties 
standard's of living and denies Plaintiff the ability to adequately 
move forward. 
A great disparity of income exists between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. At the outset, Plaintiff's income is $13,800 per year 
and Defendant's is in excess of $70,000. A substantial disparity 
of income still exists between Plaintiff and Defendant following 
the Court's failure to award alimony. 
It is obvious that the income figures are inequitable and far 
from equalized. As explained in Bell, "[w]ithout a finding on 
reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true needs of 
wife, or to determine husband's actual ability to pay and, 
therefore, to balance wife's needs against husband's ability to pay 
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men working full time. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons 
in the United States, 1986, Current Population Reports, Series P-
60, No. 157, at 2 (1987). 
Men experienced a 42% improvement in their post divorce 
standard of living, while women experienced a 73% decline. Id. at 
338-339. 
Studies have also found that a wife's employability actually 
decreases with time out of the work force. See Beninger & Smith's, 
Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support 
Determination, 16 Fam. L.Q. 201, 203 (1982). When a wife invests 
her resources jointly in the husband's "human capital" rather than 
the wife's, the couple creates a growing disparity in their earning 
potential. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and 
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support 
Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1210-11 (1981). 
In this case, Plaintiff is 40 years old. She spent 
substantial time and energy during the seven year marriage 
enhancing her husband's value in the paid labor market, but lost 
the opportunity to establish or increase her own earning potential. 
While Defendant was able to advance in his field, Plaintiff, at 
Defendant's request, sacrificed her employment skills and her 
professional abilities to stay home and care for their home, her 
minor child and the family business. 
Presently, her chances to advance in her modelling career are 
minimal. She must continue to work to support herself and based on 
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the present economic conditions, cannot quit her job and go back to 
school to better herself. She will likely live near or below the 
poverty level. Plaintiff is entitled to and in need of an alimony 
award, even if it means Defendant is "not left with much money to 
live on." See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 91 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (even though alimony and child support payments, 
together with debts that left him without means to satisfy 
financial obligations, left plaintiff without much money to live 
on, award was not inherently improper). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The Trial Court concluded that there would be sufficient funds 
generated from the property settlement for each party to pay their 
respective attorney fees. (T. at 762) . In so concluding, the 
Court abused its discretion. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 "affords litigants a broader award 
of reimbursement, if need be, for the expenses of litigation, than 
those reimbursements authorized in other civil cases." Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P. 2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted) 
quoted in Rappleye v. Rappleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 48 (Utah, 
June 15, 1993). 
The court failed to make adequate findings regarding 
Plaintiff's need for reimbursement, the parties ability to pay the 
same, and the reasonableness of the fees in light of testimony and 
the requirements of Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 13 3 6 (Utah 
App. 1988)(citation omitted). This failure constitutes abuse of 
discretion and reversible error. 
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In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990) the 
court stated: 
"[The] court abuses its discretion in awarding less than 
the amount [of attorney fees] requested unless the 
reduction is warranted" by one or more of the above 
factors. The trial court must, accordingly, identify 
such factors on the record and also explain its sua 
sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review on 
appeal, (citations omitted). 
The trial court failed to comply with these requirements, 
thereby abusing its discretion. In the absence of the appropriate 
findings by the trial court, meaningful review is not possible on 
this issue. 
Plaintiff also requests attorney fees on appeal. In the event 
Plaintiff prevails on this issue, the court should include as part 
of its remand order, the directive to the trial court to consider 
such fees in light of the disposition of this appeal. Such a 
request appears consistent with the s^me issue stated in Rappleye 
v. R&ppleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 49 (Utah June 15, 1993). 
At trial Plaintiff's attorney offered evidence that 
Plaintiff's attorney fees were reasonable. (T. at 439 et. seq.). 
In addition, Plaintiff testified that she did not have the funds 
available to pay the fees. (T. at 244) . The testimony was un-
rebutted. The Court, in its Findings of Fact, does not comment on 
the reasonableness, or lack thereof, of the fees. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1989), a trial court 
has the power to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings. An 
award must be based on (1) evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the other spouse to pay, and 
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(3) the reasonableness of the requested fees. Bell v. Bell, 810 
P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 
741-742 (Utah App. 1992). The decision to award fees lies 
primarily within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. 
In Muir, the wife's attorney proffered testimony regarding the 
amount and reasonableness of the attorney fee. The husband's 
attorney did not object. The Court then found that the wife 
incurred legal fees amounting to approximately $15,000.00. It 
ordered the husband to pay only $3,000.00 of those fees, offering 
no explanation for the reduction. The Court of Appeals noted that 
the Trial Court failed to find whether wife needed financial 
assistance and it made no findings regarding the husband's ability 
to pay the wife's attorney fees. Moreover, despite evidence 
proffered by the wife's attorney, the Court failed to make a 
finding regarding the reasonableness of the fees. 
That is exactly what the Trial Court did in the instant case. 
On remand in Muir concerning the issue of attorney fees, the Trial 
Court was directed to make specific findings regarding Plaintiff's 
financial need and Defendant's ability to pay, and further 
directing the Trial Court that if it finds both need and ability to 
pay, it must then make independent findings regarding the 
reasonableness of all fees and costs, including attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. The Muir court cited with approval Martindale 
v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App. 1989): 
Where "the evidence supporting the reasonableness of 
requested fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed, 
. . . the court abuses its discretion in awarding less 
than the amount requested unless the reduction is 
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warranted" by one or more of the established factors. 
The trial court must, accordingly, identify such factors 
on the record and also explain its sua sponte reduction 
in order to permit meaningful review on appeal. 
See also Rappleye v. Rappleye, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 
filed June 15, 1993). 
In Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P. 2d 476, 480 (Utah App. 1988) 
the Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court's failure to 
award attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. The court focused 
on the great disparity in earnings between the parties. Id. 
Plaintiff's net monthly income was approximately $200.00 and 
Defendant's was $1,405.00. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified 
she had no means to pay the fees and the parties stipulated that 
Plaintiff's attorney fees were reasonable. Id. The court noted 
that "Plaintiff's income and earning ability paled in comparison to 
those of Defendant. Id. 
Like the Andersen court, the Trial Court here abused its 
discretion when it failed to award attorney fees. Plaintiff's 
income and earning ability pale in comparison to those of the 
Defendant. The facts in this case are not like the facts in 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 817-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
and Hoagland v. Hoagland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) where the Court affirmed a non-award of attorney fees after 
concluding the financial circumstances of the parties were 
essentially equal. In this case, Plaintiff's and Defendant's 
incomes are substantially unequal. 
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Further, as evidenced under the first argument, the Court 
failed to correctly and adequately ascertain Plaintiff's financial 
need and Defendant's ability to pay. The Court, consequently, 
could not accurately determine that Defendant did not have the 
means to pay the fees. Defendant is in a much greater position to 
absorb the costs of the divorce than Plaintiff who has a relatively 
low paying job. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Considering the great disparity in incomes between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant, the length of the marriage, the 
reality that the Plaintiff has sacrificed her employment 
opportunities for her marriage and now has only limited 
occupational opportunities and skills, Plaintiff is entitled to and 
in great need of an increased amount of alimony and the payment of 
attorney fees. The Trial Court's findings, and thus its 
conclusions, regarding alimony and attorney fees were based on 
faulty and incomplete reasoning that favored Defendant over 
Plaintiff. The Court did not accurately ascertain Plaintiff's 
needs and Defendant's ability to pay. As a consequence, the Trial 
Court inequitably and unjustly made no alimony award and also 
failed completely to award attorney fees. The Trial Court clearly 
abused its discretion, mandating a reversal of its judgment on 
those two issues. 
THEREFORE, This Court should REVERSE AND REMAND this case to 
the trial court with direction that the trial court award Plaintiff 
permanent alimony of an equitable amount per month and order the 
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Defendant to pay Plaintiff's attorney fees. Attorney's fees 
incurred by Plaintiff on appeal should likewise be awarded, 
together with all costs related thereto, 
// ^ DATED this /&?- day of September, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
30-3-2 HUSBAND AND WIFE 1194 
any provision for separate maintenance previously 
granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has 
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authori-
ties of this or another state prior to the com-
mencement of the action; and (ii) the court find£ 
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or by publication, as provided by the law? 
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon 
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attor-
ney for the county where the action is prosecuted-
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the 
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out 
of this state, take depositions as necessary, at-
tend the proceedings, and make a delense as I? 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state. 
<d) In all actions the court and judge have ju-
risdiction over the payment of alimony, the dis-
tribution of property, and the custody and main-
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the de-
fendant resides in this state, upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial, of 
have an examination of the defendant by two or 
more competent physicians, to determine the 
mental condition of the defendant. For this pur-
pose either party may have leave from the court 
to enter any asylum or institution where the de-
fendant may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall he apportioned by the court. 198" 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband. 
1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness 
fees — Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30. Chapter 3, 4. 
or 6, and in any action to establish an order of cus-
tody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division o( 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a 
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the ac-
tion. The order may include provision for costs of the 
action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of prop-
erty in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. 
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the 
party is impecunious or enters in the record the rea-
son for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court 
may order a party to provide money, during the pen-
dency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in 
the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry 
of the final order or judgment may be amended dur-
ing the course of the action or in the final order or 
judgment
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30-3-4. P leadings — Findings — Decree — Seal-
ing. 
(1) (a; The complaint shall be in writing and 
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-
dence taken in the cause 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec-
tion 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divoice may not be 
granted until both parties have attended a man-
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court The court may waive this require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one 
of the parties, if it determine4" COUIM* attendance 
and completion are not necessar\, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties. 
<d> All hearings and trials foi divorce shall be 
held before the court u; ;!,«• uiuil < <»mmissioner 
as provided by Section 7<s >-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The couit or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either 
public only upon an order of the court 'I he concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public as.Mstanee. or the court 
ha \e full access to the entire record This sealing does 
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree. 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. R e p e a l e d . 1990 
30-3-5.\ Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion — Meritorious petition for modifi-
cation (Effective until January 1, 1994J. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
<bi if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5 
<i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
30-3-2 HUSBAND AND WIFE 1194 
any provision for separate maintenance previouslv 
granted 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless (i tl t defendant h is 
been adjudged insane b> the «pf r jpnate authon 
tit4- of this or another state pnor to the com 
menccment of the action, and un the couit finds 
b\ the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is mcurabU 
<bi The court shall appoint for the defendant i 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or b\ publication, as provided bv the laws 
of this state in other actions for di\orce or upon 
his- guardian ad litem and upon the countv ?ttor 
ne\ for the county where the action is prosecuted 
<c> The county attorney shall investigate the 
merit** of the case and if the defendant reside* out 
if tl is st iu take deposition- is run nv it 
tend the proceedings and make a detense as is 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state 
<d> In all actions the court and judge ha\e ju 
nsdiction over the pavment of ahmonv the dis 
tnbution of property, and the cu^todv and main 
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may if the de-
fendant resides in this state upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial or 
hav< in examination of the <M« rid int 1 \ two or 
more competent phvsiuans to determine the 
mental condition of the defend int For this pur 
pose either partv ma\ have leave from the court 
to enter an\ asvlum or institution where the de-
fendant mav be confined The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportion* d b\ the court 1987 
30-3-2 Right of husband to d ivorce . 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the w ife mav obtain a divorce from her husband 
1953 
30-3-3. A w a r d of costs, a t torney and wi tness 
fees — Temporary alimony. 
(1) In anv action filed under Title 30 Chapter 3, 4, 
or 6, and in anv action to estabhsh an order of cus-
todv v isitation. child support, ahmonv or division of 
propertv in a domestic case, the court mav order a 
partv to pav the costs, attorney fees and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees of the other partv to 
enable the other part> to prosecute or defend the ac-
tion 1 he order mav include prov ision for costs of the 
action 
(2) In anv action to enforce an order of custody, 
visitation child support alimony or division of prop 
ertv in a domestic case, the court mav award costs 
and attornev fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense 
The court, in its discretion, ma) award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the 
partv is impecunious or enters in the record the rea 
son tor not awarding fees 
(3) In anv action listed in Subsection (1) the court 
ma) order a party to provide monev during the pen-
dencv of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in 
the custodv of the other part> 
<4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry 
of the final order or judgment mav be amended dur-
ing the course of tne action or in the final order or 
judgment
 1993 
30-3-4 P lead ings — Findings — Decree — Seal-
ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and 
signed bv the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney 
(b) A decree of divorce mav not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon lega1 e\i 
dence taken in the cause 
(c) If the plaintifl and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec 
tion 78 1-2 1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divorce ma> not be 
granted until both parties have attended a man-
datory course provided in Section 30 3 113 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court The court mav waive this require-
ment on its own motion or on the motion of one 
ol the parties it u determines course attendance 
and completion are not necessary, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78 3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed bv order of the court upon the motion of either 
p irtv The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public oniv upon an order of the court rl he concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attornev filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public assibtance, or the court 
have full access to the entire record This sealing does 
not appl> to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritonous petition for modifica-
tion — Meritorious petition for modifi-
cation (Effective until January 1, 1994J. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
mav include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations and parties The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce 
<a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
pavment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children, 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children, 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5 
(0 an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage, 
(n) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
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liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses, and 
(in) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
<4> In determining visitation rights oi parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate 
family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
t6> Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon estabhshment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and de-
nied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the 
petition was without merit and not asserted or de-
fended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance 
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or 
other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award 
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attor-
ney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or 
exercise court-ordered visitation i*w.i 
Disposition of property — Mainte-
nance and health care of parties and 
children — Division of debts — Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of 
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification (Effective January 1, 
1994J. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children, 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a rea-
sonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
d) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(in) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders, 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; 
and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued 
or modified on or after January 1, 1994, that are 
subject to income withholding, an order assessing 
against the obligor an additional $7 per month 
check processing fee to be included in the amount 
withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices within the Department of Human Services 
for the purposes of income withholding in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum 
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for. it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction tc make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate 
family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and de-
nied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the 
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petition was without merit and not asserted or de-
fended against in good faith 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance 
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or 
other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12 2 where a visitation right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award 
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attor 
ney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or 
exercise court-ordered visitation I9*M 
30-3-5.1. Provis ion for income wi thhold ing in 
child s u p p o r t o rder . 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support 
it shall include in the order a provision for withhold-
ing income as a means of collecting child support as 
provided in Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4 199J 
30-3-5.2. Al legat ions of child abuse or child sex-
ual a b u s e — Invest igat ion 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order that an investiga-
tion be conducted by the Division of Family Services 
within the Department of Human Services in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Part 5 A final 
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
until a report on that investigation is received by the 
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the 
court's notice and request for an investigation In re-
viewing this report, the court shall comply with Sec-
tion 78-7-9 1992 
30-3-5.5, 30-3-6. Repea led . nwi. I<WJ 
30-3-7. When d e c r e e becomes absolu te . 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court £nd 
entered by the clerk in the register of actions if 
both the parties who have a child or children and 
the plaintifT has filed an action in the judicial 
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the 
pilot program is administered and have com-
pleted attendance at the mandatory course pro-
vided in Section 30-3-113 except if the court 
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on 
the motion of one of the parties, upon determina-
tion that course attendance and completion are 
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the 
best interest of the parties, 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the 
court may specifically designate, unless an ap-
peal or other proceedings for review are pending, 
or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes 
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own mo-
tion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or ex-
tend a designated period of time before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from 
the signing and entry of the decree. 1W2 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves their marriage by decree may marry any per-
son other than the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affir-
mance of the decree. ivss 
30-3-9. Repealed.
 196s 
30-3-10. Custody of chi ldren in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likelv to act in the best interests of the 
child including allowing the child frequent and con 
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent a.s the 
court finds appropriate 
(3) If the cour t finds t h a t one pa ren t does not desire 
custody of the child, or has a t t empted to pe rmanen t ly 
re l inquish custody to a third par ty , it shall t ake tha t 
evidence into considerat ion in de t e rmin ing whether 
to award custody to the o ther p a r e n t 1993 
30-3-10.1. J o i n t legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody" 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, pnv ileges, 
duties and powers of a parent by both parent^ 
where specified, 
(21 may include an award of exclusive author-
ity by the court to one parent to make specific 
decisions, 
(3) does not affect the physical custodv of the 
child except as specified in the order of joint legal 
custody, 
(4) is not based pn awarding equal or nearly 
equal periods of physical custody of and access to 
the child to each of the parents, as the best inter-
est of the child often requires that a primary 
physical residence for the child be designated, 
and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying 
one parent as the primary caretaker and one 
home as the primary residence of the child I<WH 
30-3-10.2. J o i n t legal cus tody o rde r — Fac tors 
for cour t de te rmina t ion — Public as-
s is tance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it 
determines that joint legal custody is in the best 
interest of the child and 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal 
custody, or 
(hi Iwth parents appear capable of implement-
ing joint legal custody. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a 
child will be served by ordering joint custody, the 
court shall consider the following factors-
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and 
emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal custody; 
<b) the ability of the parents to give first prior-
ity to the welfare of the child and reach shared 
decisions in the child's best interest, 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encour-
aging and accepting a positive relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent, 
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a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
o( Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chaii for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(di carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the- Judicial Council 
<5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court 19K8 
78-2a-3. Cour t of Appeals jur isdic t ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and l<> i^sue all writs and pro-
cess necessary. 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission. Board of Stale Lands. Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
<i> adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
tg) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first deeree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings \w> 
78-2a~4. Review of ac t ions by Supn-me Court . 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for s\nt of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. IHWJ 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Cour t of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
, \ cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative 
System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer -— Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
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covery, were not prepared specifically for use in 
and actually used in the ADR procedure. 
«4) (a) A person providing ADR as defined in this 
chapter is subject to the child abuse reporting 
requirements of Section 62A-4-503 and the crimi-
nal penalty for failure to report under Section 
62A-4-511. The confidentiality provisions of Sec-
tion 62A-4-513 apply to reports made under this 
subsection. 
(b) If the ADR provider determines a partici-
pant in the procedure has made an immediate 
threat of physical violence against a readily iden-
tifiable victim or against the provider, communi-
cations involving the threat are not confidential. 
199! 
78-31b-8. Liabilities of ADR provider . 
Providers of ADR procedure services under this 
chapter are immune from < nil liability for or result-
ing from any act or omission done or made while en-
gaged in the ADR unless the act or omission was 
made or done negligently, in bad faith, with mali-
cious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wan-
ton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of an-
other. 1991 
CHAPTER 32 
CONTEMPT 
Sr i l ion 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting con-
tempi. 
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from real prop-
erty 
7.S-32-3. In immediate presence oi court; sum-
mary action — Without immediate 
presence; procedure. 
78-32-4. Warrant of attachment or commit-
ment order to show cause. 
78-32-5. Bail. 
78-32-6. Duty of sheriff 
78-32-7. Bail bond — Form. 
78-32-8. OfTtcer's return. 
78-32-9. Hearing. 
78-32-10. Contempt — Action by court. 
78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved. 
78-32-12. Imprisonment to compel performance. 
78-32-12.1. Community service for violation of 
visitation order or failure to pay 
child support. 
78-32-12.2. Definitions — Sanctions. 
78-32-12.3. Pilot program — Purpose — Evalua-
tion of pilot program — Exceptions. 
78-32-13. Procedure when party charged fails to 
appear. 
78-32-14. Excuse for nonappearance — Unnec-
essary restraint forbidden. 
78-32-15. Contempt of process of nonjudicial of-
ficer. 
78-32-16. Procedure. 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions cons t i tu t ing con-
tempt . 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court 
or proceedings therein are contempts of the authority 
of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent be-
havior toward the judge while holding the court, 
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or 
violent disturbance, tending to interrupt the due 
course of a trial or other judicial proceeding 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful ne-
glect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, 
clerk sheriff, or other person appointed or 
elected to perform a judicial or ministerial ser-
vice. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceed 
ings of the court. b> a party to an action or spe 
cial proceeding 
f5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order 
or process of the court 
<6i Assuming to be an officer, attorney or 
counselor of a court, and acting as such without 
author it\ 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the cus-
tody of an officer by virtue of an order or process 
of such com t 
(8l Unl.iwluIU detaining a witness oi pait\ to 
an action while going to, remaining at, or return-
ing from, the court where the action is on the 
calendar for trial 
(9» Any other unlawful interference with the 
process or proceedings of a court. 
<10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served. 
or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, ne-
glecting to attend or serve as such, or improperU 
conversing with a party to an action to be tried at 
Mi'-?, i :*' <•' 'A''h an% other person concern'":' 
the merits ol such action, or receiving a commu-
nication from a party or other person in respect 
to it. without immediately disclosing the same to 
the court 
<12> Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, 
magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, or-
der or process of a superior court, or proceeding 
in an action or special proceeding contrary to 
law, after such action or special proceeding is re-
moved from the jurisdiction of such inferior tri-
bunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the 
lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also 
a contempt of the authority of such officer. I»S:I 
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from real p rop-
er ty . 
Every person dispossessed of. or ejected from or out 
of. any real projM'rty bv the judgment or process of 
any court of competent jurisdiction, who. not having a 
right so to do. re-enters into or upon, or takes posses-
sion of. any such real projwrty. or induces or procures 
any person, not having the right so to do. or aids or 
abets him therein, is guilty of a contempt of the court 
by winch such judgment was rendered, or from which 
such process issued. Upon a conviction for such con-
tempt the court must immediately issue an alias pro-
cess, directed to the proper officer, requiring him to 
restore such possession to the party entitled thereto 
under the original judgment or process ISM 
78-32-3. In immedia te p resence of court ; sum-
mary action — Without immedia te 
p resence ; p rocedure . 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate 
view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers, 
it may be punished summarily, for which an order 
must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such 
immediate view and presence, adjudging that the per-
son proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, 
and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 
78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed 
